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Abstract
Most analyses of banking crises assume that banks use real contracts. However, in
practice contracts are nominal and this is what is assumed here. We consider a standard
banking model with aggregate return risk, aggregate liquidity risk and idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks. We show that, with non-contingent nominal deposit contracts, the
rst-best ecient allocation can be achieved in a decentralized banking system. What
is required is that the central bank accommodates the demands of the private sector
for at money. Variations in the price level allow full sharing of aggregate risks. An
interbank market allows the sharing of idiosyncratic liquidity risk. In contrast, idio-
syncratic (bank-specic) return risks cannot be shared using monetary policy alone;
real transfers are needed.
We are grateful to Todd Keister, participants at the Bank of Portugal Conference on Financial In-
termediation in Faro in June 2009 and at workshops at the ESSET 2011 at Gerzensee, Federal Reserve
Banks of Chicago and New York, the Sveriges Riksbank, the University of Maryland, University of North
Carolina, and the University of Pennsylvania for helpful comments. This paper is produced as part of the
project ‘Politics, Economics and Global Governance: The European Dimensions’ (PEGGED) funded by the
Theme Socio-economic sciences and humanities of the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme
for Research. Grant Agreement no. 217559.
1 Introduction
Most models in the banking literature (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Chari and Jagan-
nathan, 1988; Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 1988; Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Allen and Gale,
1998, 2000; Diamond and Rajan, 2001, 2005) treat banking as a real activity with no role
for at money. Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), consumers’ liquidity preference is
modeled as uncertainty about their time preference for consumption. Liquid assets are mod-
eled as a storage technology. A deposit contract promises a depositor a xed amount of
consumption depending on the date of withdrawal. Thus, a crisis can arise when a large
number of consumers decide to withdraw their deposits from the banking system, because
the demand for goods is greater than the banks’ limited stock of liquid assets.
While “real” models have provided valuable insights into the nature of nancial fragility,
they do not capture important aspects of reality, such as the role of at money in the nancial
system. In practice, nancial contracts are almost always written in terms of money. This
fact has important consequences for the theory. Because the central bank can costlessly
create at money in a crisis, there is no reason why the banking system should nd itself
unable to meet its commitments to depositors. As Willem Buiter (2007) has argued,
“Liquidity is a public good. It can be managed privately (by hoarding inherently
liquid assets), but it would be socially inecient for private banks and other
nancial institutions to hold liquid assets on their balance sheets in amounts
sucient to tide them over when markets become disorderly. They are meant to
intermediate short maturity liabilities into long maturity assets and (normally)
liquid liabilities into illiquid assets. Since central banks can create unquestioned
money at the drop of a hat, in any amount and at zero cost, they should be the
money providers of last resort both as lender of last resort and as market maker
of last resort....”
In this paper, we develop a model, based on Allen, Carletti and Gale (2009), henceforth ACG,
in which at money is issued by the central bank. Deposit contracts and loan contracts are
denominated in terms of money and money is used in transactions. In other words, money
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is both a unit of account and a medium of exchange.1 In contrast to most of the banking
literature, which is reviewed in detail below, we show that the combination of nominal
contracts and a central bank policy of accommodating commercial banks’ demand for money
leads to rst best eciency. This result holds when there are aggregate liquidity and asset
return shocks and also when there are idiosyncratic (bank specic) liquidity shocks.
Time is represented by a sequence of three dates and, at each date, there is a single
good that can be used for consumption or investment. Assets are represented by constant
returns to scale technologies that allow the the consumers’ initial endowment of the good
to be transformed into consumption at the second and third dates. The short-term asset is
represented by a storage technology: one unit of the good invested in this technology yields
one unit of the good at the next date. The long-term asset is represented by a technology
that requires an investment at the initial date and yields a random return at the nal date.
The expected return of the long-term asset is greater than the return of the short-term asset.
There is a large number of ex ante identical consumers, each of whom is endowed with
one unit of the good at the initial date. At the beginning of the second date, each consumer
receives a time-preference shock that makes him either an early consumer, who wants to
consume only at the second date, or a late consumer, who wants to consume only at the
third date. The proportion of early and late consumers is itself random, an important source
of aggregate uncertainty.
We characterize the rst best allocation as the solution to a planner’s problem. The
planner invests the consumers’ endowments in a portfolio of short- and long-term assets and
then distributes the returns to these assets to the early and late consumers. The portfolio is
chosen before the realization of the aggregate state, that is, the fraction of early consumers
and the return on the risky asset. The consumption allocation is determined after the
realization of the aggregate state and is therefore state contingent. We then show how this
allocation can be implemented using a simple institutional structure and non-contingent
nominal contracts.
In the decentralized economy, there are three types of institutions, a central bank, com-
mercial banks and rms. At the initial date, the central bank makes money available to
1In what follows, “money” refers to at money issued by the central bank.
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the commercial banks on an intraday basis at a zero interest rate. The banks make loans
to the rms and the rms in turn use the money to buy the consumers’ endowments and
invest them in the short- and long-term assets. At the intermediate and nal dates, the
central bank again makes intraday loans to the banks. The banks use this money to pay
for depositors’ withdrawals. The depositors in turn use the money to purchase goods from
the rms. Then the rms use the same money to repay their loans to their banks and the
banks use it to repay the central bank. The central bank’s policy is passive: at each date it
supplies the amount of money demanded by the commercial banks. Commercial banks and
rms are assumed to be prot maximizing but in a competitive equilibrium they earn zero
prot. Consumers are expected utility maximizers, but in equilibrium their decision problem
is simple: they deposit the money received in exchange for the sale of their endowments at
the rst date and withdraw and spend all their money at the second or third date, depending
on whether they are early or late consumers.
The main features of our model are the following:
• A competitive equilibrium implements the same state-contingent allocation as the
planner’s problem, even though deposit contracts represent a xed claim (in terms
of money) on the banks.
In spite of the debt-like nature of the deposit contract, it is possible to implement a state-
contingent allocation because deposit contracts are written in terms of money. Regardless
of the liquidity and asset return shocks, banks are able to meet their commitments as long
as the central bank supplies them with sucient amounts of at money. The price level
adjusts in response to aggregate shocks in order to clear markets. When the number of early
consumers is high, the amount of money withdrawn from the banks is also high and this
increases the price level. When the returns on the long asset are low, the supply of goods
is also low and this increases the price level. The adjustments in the price level ensure that
early and late consumers’ receive the ecient, state-contingent levels of consumption.
• A central bank policy of passively accommodating the demands of the commercial
banks for money is sucient to eliminate nancial crises and achieve the rst best.
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The role of the central bank is simply to provide the necessary money so that each bank can
meet withdrawals by its depositors. Price level adjustments lead to the of optimal level of
real balances and the optimal allocation of consumption at each date.
• The quantity theory of money holds in equilibrium: the price level at each date is
proportional to the supply of money extended to the commercial banks by the central
bank.
This result follows from the market-clearing condition in the goods market at each date.
More surprisingly, money is super-neutral in this model.
• The central bank can control the nominal interest rate and the expected ination rate,
but it has no eect on the equilibrium allocation of goods.
It is crucial that at money only circulates within the trading day. No one holds at money
between dates. Instead, consumers hold bank deposits and banks hold loans. Deposits and
loans are denominated in terms of money, but they are also interest bearing, so any change
in the expected ination rate is compensated by a change in the nominal interest rate. Thus,
money is not merely neutral, it is super-neutral.
The baseline model can be extended in a number of ways. We can introduce idiosyn-
cratic (bank-specic) liquidity shocks without upsetting the eciency results. The interbank
market allows banks to reshue money between banks that receive high and low liquidity
shocks at the second date so that each bank can meet the required level of withdrawal by
its depositors, without being subject to distress. The process is reversed at the third date,
so that banks with a large proportion of late consumers can meet the higher number of
withdrawals then. We can also extend the eciency result to a multi-period setting.
• First best eciency can be achieved by monetary policy alone when the model is
extended to allow for idiosyncratic (bank-specic) liquidity risk and multiple periods.
Accommodative monetary policy alone is not always sucient to achieve eciency, however.
• Monetary policy alone is not sucient to allow the sharing of idiosyncratic (bank-
specic) asset return risk.
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If the banks’ asset-specic returns are observable, the government could introduce an in-
surance scheme. Alternatively, a private scheme could achieve the same end by securitizing
the assets and allowing banks to hold a diversied portfolio of asset backed securities. Such
schemes are vulnerable to moral hazard if there is asymmetric information about asset re-
turns. Insuring low returns gives banks an incentive to engage in asset substitution and to
misrepresent the realized returns of the assets. Clearly, pooling idiosyncratic return risks is
more dicult than implementing an accommodative monetary policy.
The results obtained from our monetary model of banking stand in stark contrast to those
obtained from models with real contracts. ACG is a case in point. In their model, banks face
uncertain liquidity demands from their customers at the second date. If this uncertainty is
idiosyncratic and there is no uncertainty about aggregate liquidity preference, the interbank
market eciently redistributes liquid assets among banks, allowing each bank to meet the
needs of its customers. If there is uncertainty about aggregate liquidity preference, on the
other hand, it is not sucient merely to re-shue the existing stock of the liquid asset.
The long term-asset will have to be sold to obtain additional liquidity and this may require
changes in interest rates and asset prices. Some banks will suer capital losses and may not
be able to meet their commitments to their customers. It is critical here that markets are
assumed to be incomplete, so that there is no way the banks can hedge their liquidity shocks.
ACG show that the introduction of a central bank may solve this problem. The central
bank engages in open market operations to x the price of the long asset at the end of
the rst period (or equivalently x the short term interest rate). This intervention removes
the ineciency associated with a lack of hedging opportunities and allows the banks to
implement the constrained ecient allocation provided there is no bankruptcy. This result
is in line with the argument of Goodfriend and King (1988) that open market operations are
sucient to address pure liquidity risk on the interbank market.
The ACG result is surprising because it suggests that open market operations aimed at
providing adequate aggregate liquidity can, at the same time, implement constrained-ecient
risk sharing in the presence of aggregate uncertainty about the timing of consumption. In
fact, the intervention of the central bank seems to go beyond the normal scope of monetary
policy. In addition to providing money by buying and selling government bonds, the central
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bank is responsible for actions that normally fall within the purview of the Treasury, such
as varying the size of the national debt and levying lump sum taxes to pay for the debt.
As Kiyotaki (2009) points out, this kind of “heavy” intervention in the economy makes the
eciency result less surprising and perhaps less likely to be implemented by the central bank.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The remainder of this section considers the
related literature in detail. Section 2 describes the primitives of the real economy. The
ecient allocation is derived in Section 3, where we describe and solve the appropriate
planner’s problem. In Section 4, we introduce a nancial system with money as a medium of
exchange and dene the equilibrium of this economy. The main results are found in Section 5,
where we show that the ecient allocation can be decentralized as an equilibrium. A number
of simple extensions are considered. In Section 6.1, the results of Section 4 are extended to
allow for arbitrary nominal interest rates. In Section 6.2, we allow for idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks to individual banks and show that the interbank market allows the ecient allocation
to be decentralized in this case too. Section 6.3 considers the case of idiosyncratic return
risk. The multi-period case is considered in Section 6.4. Finally, Section 7 contains some
concluding remarks. Some of the longer proofs are relegated to the appendixes in Sections 8
and 9.
1.1 Related literature
As we have noted, most of the literature on banking crises has assumed contracts are written
in real terms. The papers that have considered at money and banking crises can be divided
into two strands. The rst introduces banks into models of at currency. Many of these
models seek to explain historical crises that occurred at a time when at currency played an
important role in the nancial system. Skeie (2008) points out that in modern nancial sys-
tems, at currency no longer plays a very signicant role. The vast majority of transactions
involve the transfer of money from one bank account to another. The second strand of the
literature considers this type of nancial system without introducing at currency.
An important contribution to the rst strand is Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996).
They address the issue of why Canada had no banking crises in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries while the U.S. had many. Their explanation is that Canada
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allowed the amount of money in circulation to expand to meet demand during harvest time
while the U.S. nancial system was such that this could not happen. The eect of this
dierence was that in Canada liquidity shocks could be easily absorbed but in the U.S. they
led to banking panics. Since currency played an important role during this period, they
use an overlapping generations model with two-period lived consumers to justify the use
of currency. The consumers live in two dierent locations. Instead of random preference
shocks as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), consumers are subject to relocation shocks. Each
period a random proportion of young consumers in each location is forced to move to the
other location. These shocks are symmetric so that the population in each place remains
constant. Banks make risk-free loans, hold reserves of currency, issue bank notes and write
deposit contracts that are contingent on the proportion of the consumers that relocate.
When young consumers relocate they can transport currency or the notes issued by the
banks with them but nothing else. The authors show that if the banks are allowed to vary
their issuance of notes to accommodate the dierent levels of relocation shocks then there
exists a stationary Pareto optimal equilibrium. In this equilibrium, currency and bank notes
are perfect substitutes and the nominal interest rate is zero. However, if the bank note
issuance is xed so the random relocation demand cannot be accommodated, there will be
a banking crisis if the shock is large enough to exhaust the banks’ currency reserves. The
authors interpret these two possibilities as being consistent with the Canadian and U.S.
experiences from 1880-1910, respectively.
Antinol, Huybens andKeister (2001) build on the model of Champ, Smith andWilliamson
(1996) by replacing the private issue of bank notes with a lender of last resort that is willing
to lend freely at a zero nominal interest rate. A stationary Pareto optimal equilibrium again
exists but in addition there is a continuum of nonoptimal inationary equilibria. Antinol,
Huybens and Keister are able to show that these can be eliminated if the lender of last
resort places an appropriately chosen upper bound on the amount that each individual bank
can borrow or is willing to lend freely at a zero real interest rate. Smith (2002) considers
a similar model but without elastic money supply. He shows that the lower the ination
rate and nominal interest rate, the lower is the probability of a banking crisis. Reducing the
ination rate to zero in line with the Friedman rule eliminates banking crises. However, this
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is inecient as it leads banks to hold excessive cash reserves at the expense of investment in
higher yielding assets.
Cooper and Corbae (2002) consider a model with increasing returns to scale in the inter-
mediation process between savers and entrepreneurs. This leads to multiple equilibria that
are interpreted as dierent levels of condence. A calibrated version of the model with low
condence levels is able to match many features of the Great Depression.
Diamond and Rajan (2001) develop a model where banks have special skills to ensure
that loans are repaid. By issuing real demand deposits, banks can precommit to recoup their
loans. This allows long term projects to be funded and depositors to consume when they have
liquidity needs. However, this arrangement leads to the possibility of a liquidity shortage in
which banks curtail credit when there is a real shock. Diamond and Rajan (2006) introduce
money and nominal deposit contracts into this model to investigate whether monetary policy
can help alleviate this problem. They assume there are two sources of value for money. The
rst arises from the fact that money can be used to pay taxes (the scal value). The second
is that money facilitates transactions (the transactions demand). They show that the use of
money can improve risk sharing since price adjustments introduce a form of state contingency
to contracts. However, this is not the only eect. Variations in the transactions value of
money can lead to bank failures. Monetary intervention can help to ease this problem. If
the central bank buys bonds with money, this changes liquidity conditions in the market
and allows banks to fund more long-term projects than would be possible in the absence of
intervention.
Allen and Gale (1998) develop a model of banking crises caused by asset return uncer-
tainty with three dates, early and late consumers as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and
initially, real contracts. Building on the empirical work of Gorton (1988), it is assumed
that at the intermediate date investors receive a signal concerning the return of the banks’
long term assets. If the signal indicates returns are suciently low, the late consumers will
withdraw their deposits along with the early consumers and there will be a banking crisis.
Allen and Gale go on to show that if contracts are written in nominal terms and a central
bank can supply money to commercial banks then the incentive-ecient allocation can be
implemented. The central bank gives money to the banks and they then pay this out to-
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gether with goods to depositors. The early depositors use their money to buy goods from
early withdrawing late consumers who then hold money until the nal date. Variations in
the price level allow risk sharing.
Cao and Illing (2011) develop a model where banks can invest in a liquid asset with a
return one period away or an illiquid asset with a higher return but where the date of payo
is random. It could be one or two periods away. They consider the case where a central bank
can create money as in Allen and Gale (1998) and prevent a banking crisis when payout from
the illiquid asset is delayed. The problem is that this policy creates a moral hazard. The
fact that banks know that the central bank will provide liquidity when there is a shortage
makes them more willing to invest in the illiquid asset. In the equilibrium with intervention,
they overinvest relative to the ecient allocation. Imposing equity requirements does not
solve this problem. However, a policy of imposing ex ante liquidity requirements and having
the central bank create money ex post does allow the optimal second best contract to be
implemented.
The second strand of papers starts with Skeie (2008), who develops a standard banking
model with nominal contracts and at money within the banking system. Depositors are
subject to preference shocks in the usual way. There is no aggregate liquidity risk or return
uncertainty. In contrast to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) he shows that there is a unique
equilibrium and it is ecient. If deposits are withdrawn by late consumers at the intermediate
date the price of the consumption good adjusts and this discourages such withdrawals. In
order for there to be runs on banks there must be some other friction such as problems in
the interbank market. Freixas, Martin and Skeie (2009) develop a model with aggregate
liquidity risk, which like ACG also has idiosyncratic liquidity shocks to banks. The main
part of their paper undertakes a real analysis where they show that there can be multiple
equilibria. The central bank can determine the interest rate to implement the equilibrium
with the ecient allocation. In an appendix, they show that money can be introduced along
the lines of Skeie (2008) and the same results hold.
The current paper belongs in this second strand of literature. All payments are made
with at money and money can be created costlessly by the central bank. In contrast
to the other papers surveyed here, it is shown that rst best eciency, rather than just
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incentive or constrained eciency, can be achieved in a wide range of situations. This
includes aggregate and idiosyncratic liquidity risk as well as aggregate asset return risk. An
accommodative monetary policy can prevent crises and implement an ecient allocation of
resources. Idiosyncratic asset return shocks are more dicult to deal with. They require
more intensive intervention by the government or private risk-sharing institutions. The
model provides a benchmark for studying more realistic models with market imperfections
and the interventions required to correct them.
2 The real economy
In this section we describe the primitives of the real economy. The model is based on ACG.
There are three dates  = 0 1 2 and a single good that can be used for consumption or
investment at each date.
There are two assets, a short-term asset that we refer to as the short asset and a long-
term asset that we refer to as the long asset. The short asset is represented by a riskless
storage technology, where one unit of the good invested at date  produces one unit of the
good at date  + 1, for  = 0 1. The long asset is a constant-returns-to-scale investment
technology that takes two periods to mature: one unit of the good invested in the long asset
at date 0 produces a random return equal to  units of the good at date 2.
There is a large number (strictly, a continuum with unit measure) of identical consumers.
All consumers have an endowment of one unit of the good at date 0 and nothing at dates
1 and 2. Consumers are uncertain about their future time preferences. With probability 
they are early consumers, who only value the good at date 1, and with probability 1  
they are late consumers, who only value the good at date 2. The fraction of early consumers
 is a random variable. The utility of consumption is denoted by  () where  (·) is a von
Neumann Morgenstern utility function with the usual properties.
We assume that the random variables  and  have a joint cumulative distribution
function  . We assume that, the support of  is the interval [0 1]× [0 max]. The mean of
 is denoted by ¯ 	 1 and the mean of  is denoted by 0 
 ¯ 
 1. Since all consumers are
symmetric, ¯ is also the probability that a typical consumer is an early consumer.
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Uncertainty about time preferences generates a preference for liquidity and a role for
intermediaries as providers of liquidity insurance. The expected utility of a consumption
prole (1 2) is given by
¯(1) +
¡
1 ¯¢(2)
where   0 denotes consumption at date  = 1 2.
All uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of date 1. In particular, the state () is re-
vealed and depositors learn whether they are early or late consumers. While each depositor’s
realization of liquidity demand is private information, the state () is publicly observed.
3 The ecient allocation
Suppose that a central planner were to make all the investment and consumption decisions
in order to maximize the expected utility of the representative consumer. At the rst date,
the planner would invest the representative consumer’s endowment of 1 unit of the good in
a portfolio consisting of 0    1 units of the short asset and 1  units of the long asset.
Then, at the second date, once the aggregate state of nature () is known, the planner
would assign 1 () units of the good to the representative early consumer and 2 ()
units of the good to the representative late consumer. The total amount of consumption
available at date 1 is given by , the amount invested in the short asset. Since the fraction
of early consumers is , the planner’s allocation will be feasible at date 1 if and only if
1 ()   (1)
for every aggregate state (). The left hand side of (1) is the total amount consumed
at date 1 and the right hand side is the total supply of goods. If the amount consumed,
1 (), is less than the total supply, , the dierence
 ( ) =   1 () 
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is stored until the last period. At date 2, the fraction of late consumers is 1   so the
planner’s allocation will be feasible if and only if
(1 ) 2 () = (1 )+  () (2)
= (1 )+   1 () 
for every aggregate state (). The left hand side of (2) is total consumption at date 2 and
the right hand side is the total supply of the good. We assume the two sides are equal since
all of the good must be used up at the last date. Re-arranging the terms in the equation
above, we can re-write this condition in terms of total consumption at dates 1 and 2 and the
total returns of the two assets:
1 () + (1 ) 2 () =  + (1 ) (3)
The planner’s task is to maximize the expected utility of the representative consumer
subject to the feasibility constraints (1) and (3). A necessary condition for maximizing the
expected utility of the representative consumer is that, given the portfolio  chosen at the
rst date, the expected utility of the representative consumer is maximized in each aggregate
state (). In other words, for a given value of  and a given state (), the allocation must
maximize the representative consumer’s expected utility subject to the feasibility conditions
(1) and (3). This problem can be written as
max  (1) + (1 ) (2)
s.t. 1   1 + (1 ) 2 =  + (1 ) (4)
This problem has a very simple yet elegant solution. Either there is no storage, in which
case 1 =  and (1 ) 2 = (1 ), or there is positive storage between the two dates,
in which case 1 = 2 =  + (1 ). This solution can be summarized by the following
two “consumption functions,”
1 () = min
n

  + (1 )
o
 (5)
2 () = max
½
(1 )
1    + (1 )
¾
 (6)
These consumption functions are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
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– Figure 1 about here –
The left hand panel illustrates the relationship between consumption and , holding 
constant. For very small values of , the late consumers would receive less than the early
consumers if there were no storage. This cannot be optimal, so some of the returns of the
short asset will be re-invested up to the point where consumption is equalized between early
and late consumers. At some critical value of , the long asset provides just enough to
equalize the consumption of early and late consumers without storage. For higher values of
, early consumers consume the output of the short asset (i.e., there is no storage). Late
consumers consume the entire output of the long asset and their per capita consumption is
increasing in .
The right hand panel illustrates the relationship between consumption and , holding 
constant. For small values of , the short asset provides more consumption than is needed
by early consumers, so some is stored and given to late consumers. At the margin, the rate
of exchange between early and late consumption is one for one, so optimality requires that
early and late consumers receive the same consumption. For some critical value of , there is
just enough of the short asset to provide early consumers the same amount of consumption
as late consumers. That is, 

= (1)
1 . For higher values of , early consumers continue to
consume the entire output of the short asset but their per capita consumption is declining
in . The late consumers by contrast, receive the entire output of the long asset and their
per capita consumption is increasing as  increases.
Note that the consumption functions in (5) and (6) are determined by the choice of 
and the exogenous shocks (), so the planner’s problem can be reduced to maximizing
the expected utility of the representative consumer with respect to . The optimal portfolio
choice problem is:
max

 [ (1 ()) + (1 ) (2 ())]  (7)
where 1 () and 2 () are dened in (5) and (6). The solution to the planner’s problem
is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The unique solution to the planner’s problem consists of a portfolio choice
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 and a pair of consumption functions 1 () and 

2 () such that 
 solves the portfolio
choice problem (7) and 1 () and 

2 () satisfy (5) and (6), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A in Section 8.
4 Money and exchange
In this section we describe a decentralized economy consisting of four groups of actors, a
central bank that provides at money to the private sector; a banking sector that borrows
from the central bank, makes loans and takes deposits; a productive sector that borrows from
the banking sector in order to invest in the short and long assets; and a consumption sector
that sells its initial endowment to rms and deposits the proceeds in the banking sector to
provide for future consumption.
The central bank’s only function is to provide money that the private sector needs to
facilitate transactions. It lends to banks on an intraday basis and charges zero interest. The
central bank’s policy is passive in the sense that it provides whatever amounts of money the
banks demand.
There is free entry to the commercial banking sector. Banks compete for deposits by
oering contracts that oer consumers future payments in exchange for current deposits.
Consumers respond by choosing the most attractive of the contracts oered. Free entry
ensures that banks oer deposit contracts that maximize consumers’ welfare and earn zero
prots in equilibrium. Otherwise, a bank could enter and make a positive prot by oering a
more attractive contract. There is no loss of generality in assuming that consumers deposit
all their money in a bank at date 0 since the bank can do anything the consumers can do.
The bank promises the consumer 1 units of money if he withdraws at date 1 and 2 units
of money if he withdraws at date 2.
There is free entry to the productive sector, which ensures that in equilibrium rms earn
zero prots. Firms take out one period loans from banks in the rst period and use the
money to purchase goods from the consumers. These goods are invested in the two assets.
Some of the returns from these assets are sold at date 1 and used to repay part of the
rm’s debt. The rest is rolled over and repaid at date 2 using the proceeds from selling the
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remaining asset returns at date 2.
As described earlier, consumers have an initial endowment of goods which they sell in
exchange for money at the rst date. This money deposited in the consumers’ bank accounts
and provides income that can be used for consumption in future periods. Consumers have
Diamond-Dybvig preferences and maximize expected utility.
We assume that all transactions are mediated by money. Money is exchanged for goods
and goods for money, loans are made and repaid in terms of money. Only banks have access
to loans from the central bank and only rms have access to loans from the banks. Consumers
can save using deposit accounts at the banks. Given the timing of consumption, there is
no need for consumers to borrow.2 Consumers have the option to purchase goods and store
them. Banks can lend to one another on an interbank market, but for the moment there is
no need for this activity. There are no forward markets. These assumptions give rise to a
particular ow of funds at each date, which we describe next.
Date 0 The transactions occur in the following order:
1. Banks borrow funds from the central bank.
2. Firms borrow from the banks.
3. Firms purchase goods from the consumers.
4. Consumers deposit the proceeds from the sale of goods in their bank accounts.
5. Banks repay their intraday loans to the central bank.
The ow of funds at date 0 is illustrated in Figure 2 below. We see that the money supply
0 created by the central bank follows a circuit from the central bank to banks to rms to
consumers to banks and, nally, back to the central bank. At each stage the same amount
of money changes hands so that the net demand for money is zero at the end of the period.
– Figure 2 here –
2As Cone (1983) and Jacklin (1987) showed, consumers must be excluded from the market for borrowing
and lending at date 1, otherwise they will undermine the ability of the banks to provide them with liquidity
insurance.
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Dates 1 and 2 At the beginning of the second date, all uncertainty is resolved. Each
consumer learns whether he is an early or late consumer and the aggregate state () is
realized. Transactions occur in the same order at date 1 and date 2:
1. Banks borrow funds from the central bank.
2. Consumers withdraw their savings from their bank accounts.
3. Consumers use these funds to purchase goods from the rms.
4. Firms repay part of their loans to the banks.
5. Banks repay their intraday loans to the central bank.
The ow of funds is illustrated for date 1 in Figure 3. The pattern is the same for date
2. As before, the net demand for money at the end of the period is zero.
– Figure 3 here –
4.1 Market clearing and the price level
We assume that all trades in the economy are mediated by money. Fiat money is provided
to commercial banks by the central bank. The central bank does not charge interest on
intraday balances. At date 0, the banks lend money to the rms to allow them to purchase
goods from the consumers who have the money transferred to their accounts in the banks.
The banks use these deposits to repay the intraday loan to the central bank. At date 1, the
banks again borrow money from the central bank and give it to the early consumers who
choose to purchase goods from the rms at the second date. The rms then use the money
to repay part of their loans to the bank. The banks return the money to the central bank.
At date 2, this process is repeated: the banks borrow money from the central bank to pay
the late consumers who spend the money on goods. The rms use the money to repay the
balance of their loans and the banks return the money to the central bank.
The (nominal) interest rate on loans between periods  and  + 1 is denoted by +1.
That is, one dollar borrowed at date  requires a repayment of 1+ +1 dollars at date +1.
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Without essential loss of generality we can set interest rates to zero: 1 = 2 = 0 (this
assumption is relaxed in Section 6.1).
To describe an allocation of money and goods we need the following notation:
0 = money supply at date 0;
0 = price level at date 0;
 = investment in the short asset at date 0;
 () = money supply at date  = 1 2 in state ();
 () = price level at date  = 1 2 in state ();
 () = consumption at date  = 1 2 in state ();
 = money value of deposit at date  = 1 2.
The standard homogeneity property of excess demands with respect to prices allows us
to normalize the price level at date 0 to unity:
0 = 1
At date 0 the demand for money comes from rms, who need the money in order to buy
goods from consumers. Since there is one unit of the good (per capita), rms will borrow
one unit of money from the banks in order to purchase the goods. The banks demand this
amount of money from the central bank, which therefore must supply the amount
0 = 0 = 1 (8)
to meet the banks’ demand.
At date 1, early consumers withdraw their deposit 1 from the bank and supply it
inelastically in exchange for consumption goods. The amount needed by banks is therefore
1 and this is the amount supplied by the central bank:
1 () = 1 (9)
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The rms supply either , if 1 () 	 2 (), or an amount less than or equal to , if
1 () = 2 (). In the latter case, rms are indierent about whether to sell or store
the goods so, in equilibrium, they supply the amount demanded by consumers. Thus, the
goods market clears if
1 ()   (10)
The rms return their revenue to the banks in partial payment of their debts and the re-
maining debt is rolled over.
At date 2, late consumers use their deposit 2 in the bank and supply it inelastically in
exchange for consumption goods. The amount needed by banks is therefore (1 )2 and
this is the amount supplied by the central bank:
2 () = (1 )2 (11)
The rms supply all their goods inelastically, that is the return from the long asset, (1 ),
plus the amount stored from the previous period,   1 (). Thus, the goods market
clears if
1 () + (1 ) 2 () = (1 )+  (12)
The rms use the proceeds from their sales of the consumption good to repay their remaining
debt to the banks.
4.2 The bank’s decision
The representative bank’s decision problem is quite simple. At the rst date, the bank lends
money to rms and accepts the money as deposits from consumers. In order to satisfy its
budget constraint, the outow of loans must equal the inow of deposits. Without loss
of generality, consider the case of a bank that makes loans of one dollar and receives an
equal amount of deposits. Since the nominal interest rate has been normalized to zero, the
repayment of the loan will yield a stream of payments equal to one dollar spread across the
last two dates. The bank oers a deposit contract that promises 1 dollars if the depositor
withdraws at date 1 and 2 dollars if he withdraws at date 2. This is feasible for the bank
if 1 + (1 )2  1 for every (). In case the repayment of loans does not coincide
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with the withdrawal of deposits, the bank will plan to use the interbank market to obtain
money as needed. In equilibrium, the two ows will be perfectly matched. Competition
among banks will cause them to oer depositors the most attractive deposit contracts. This
implies that
1 + (1 )2 = 1
Assuming a non-degenerate distribution of , this condition must be satised for multiple
values of  and this is only possible if 1 and 2 are equal and, hence, equal to 1. The bank
will earn zero prots and there is no possibility of doing better.
4.3 The rm’s decision
Now consider the representative rm’s decision problem. Since the rm’s technology exhibits
constant returns to scale, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to a rm that
borrows one unit of money at date 0. The rm can obtain one unit of the good with the
money it has borrowed, since 0 = 1. Suppose it invests  units in the short asset and 1 
units in the long asset. This will produce  units of the good at date 1 and (1 ) units
of the good at date 1. In equilibrium, it must be optimal to hold the long asset between
dates 1 and 2 in every state (). It may be also optimal to store the good between dates 1
and 2. These conditions require that 1 ()  2 (), otherwise the short asset would
dominate the long asset at date 1, and 1 () = 2 () in any state in which the good
is stored between dates 1 and 2. Then, in any case, it will be optimal for the rm to set
storage equal to zero in calculating the optimal prot. Since the nominal interest rate is
zero, the rm’s total revenue is 1 ()  + 2 () (1 ) in state (). Then the
rm’s budget constraint requires that
1 ()  + 2 () (1 )  1  () 
and the prot will be zero in equilibrium if and only if the equality holds as an equation for
every value of ().3
3The zero-prot condition at date 0 implies that the rm must earn zero prots in a set of states that
occurs with probability one. Since the price functions are continuous in (), the continuity of prices in
() implies that the zero-prot condition holds for every state in the support of the distribution.
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To sum up, the rm’s choice of  is optimal if it yields zero prot in every state and
there is no alternative plan that yields non-negative prot everywhere and positive prot
with positive probability. More formally, the zero-prot condition for  can be written
1 () 
 + 2 () (1 ) = 1  () 
and the requirement that no feasible  yields positive prot can be written as follows: if
there exists a state () 
1 ()  + 2 () (1 ) 	 1
then there exists a state (0 0) such that
1 (
0 0)  + 2 (0 0) (1 ) 
 1
In other words, a production plan 0 that produces positive prots in some state must produce
negative prots in another state.
The assumption that rms must satisfy their budget constraints with probability one
is obviously restrictive. This kind of assumption is standard in general equilibrium theory.
One interpretation is that the bank making the loan imposes covenants that prevent the rm
from undertaking any production plan that carries a risk of default. In practice, banks have
limited information about the actions chosen by rms. It is well known that asymmetric
information gives rise to moral hazard and the possibility of default and there is a vast
literature dealing with these problems. We ignore these issues in order to provide a set of
sucient conditions in which monetary policy can achieve the rst best. This has to be
regarded as a benchmark model.
4.4 The consumer’s decision
The consumer’s decision is straightforward. Consumers deposit the proceeds from selling
their endowment of goods to rms. If they turn out to be early consumers they use the
withdrawals from their bank accounts to purchase consumption goods at date 1 If they are
late consumers they will keep their funds in the bank at date 1 provided
20
1 ()  2 () 
At date 2 they will use their savings to purchase goods from the rms.
4.5 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of the price functions ( 0  

1 (·)   2 (·)), the money supply functions
(0 

1 (·) 2 (·)), the portfolio choice , the consumption functions (1 (·)  2 (·)) and the
deposit contract (1 

2) such that the following conditions are satised.
Market clearing The market clearing conditions (8) through (12) are satised.
Optimal bank behavior The representative bank lends to rms and accepts deposits at
the rst date. It oers a deposit contract (1

2) = (1 1) to depositors.
Optimal rm behavior The representative rm buys one unit of the good at date 0 and
chooses a portfolio  such that  1 () 
+ 2 () (1 ) = 1 for every ().
This is optimal for the rm if, for any ,
 1 ()  + 

2 () (1 ) 	 1  ()
implies  1 (
0 0)  +  2 (
0 0) (1 )0 
 1  (0 0) 
Optimal consumer behavior Each consumer supplies his endowment inelastically at date
0 and has the money he receives in exchange deposited in his bank account. He uses
this one unit of money at date 1 if he is an early consumer to purchase
1 () =
1
 1 ()
units of the good. Similarly, if he is a late consumer, he uses the one unit of money at
date 2 to enable him to consume
2 () =
1
 2 ()
units of the good.
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It is interesting to note that the equilibrium dened above satises the Quantity Theory
of Money. If the total income (equals total expenditure) at date  = 1 2 is denoted by
 () and dened by
1 () = 1 () and 2 () = (1 ) 2 () 
then the market-clearing conditions imply that
 () =  () () 
for every state () and each date  = 1 2. The Quantity Theory of Money is satised in
the sense that the price level at each date is proportional to the amount of money supplied
by the central bank.
5 Decentralization
In this section we show the existence of an ecient equilibrium. Our approach is constructive.
We assume that the equilibrium allocation is ecient, that is, the amount invested in the
short asset, , and the consumption functions, (1 (·)  2 (·)), are taken from the solution to
the planner’s problem discussed in Section 3. Then the goods-market-clearing conditions,
(10) and (12), are satised by construction. It remains to show that the money supply,
prices, and deposit contracts can be dened to satisfy the equilibrium conditions.
We set the deposit contracts (1 

2) = (1 1) and then use the consumers’ budget
constraints to dene the price functions   () for  = 1,
 1 () =
1
1 ()
(13)
and for  = 2,
 2 () =
1
2 ()
 (14)
The money supply by the central bank responds passively to the commercial banks’ demand
at each date so we can use the money-market-clearing equations (9) and (11) to dene the
22
central bank’s money supply functions:
1 () = 
and
2 () = 1 
The banks’ total liabilities (deposits) at date 0 are equal to their assets (loans). They
lend  0 = 1 to rms and receive deposits of 

0 = 1. In state () at date 1, withdrawals
equal  and repayments by rms also equal . In state () at date 2, withdrawals equal
1 . Since interest rates are zero, the total repayment of the loans will equal the original
loan amount and the bank makes zero prots on the loan. Similarly, the withdrawals equal
the original deposit amount and the bank makes zero prots on the deposits.
Finally, consider the rms’ problem. As we have shown, the rm will make zero prots
since the amount of money it receives for its output, +1 = 1, is equal to the amount of
money it originally borrows from the bank. It is feasible for the rm to supply the optimal
levels of consumption, 1 () and (1 ) 2 (), at dates 1 and 2 respectively. To see
that this is optimal, we have to check that it is optimal for the rm to store the good in
states where 1 () 
 
. But from the planner’s problem, we know that 1 () 
 

implies that 1 () = 

2 (), in which case the denition of price functions in equations
(13) and (14) implies that  1 () = 

2 (). Thus, storage is optimal.
To complete our demonstration of the optimality of the rm’s behavior, we have to show
that the rm cannot protably deviate from the specied production plan without being
unable to repay its loan in some states. Without loss of generality, we can assume the rm
borrows one unit of cash from a bank at date 0. The rm must choose a value of  so that
it can repay this debt in every state (). Let (0 0) be a state satisfying 0 =  and
0 	 1. Then

0
= 1 

1 
1 00
which implies that 1 (0 0) 
 

2 (0 0). In fact, the continuity of the feasibility conditions
implies that 1 () 
 

2 () for any state () suciently close to (0 0). The rms’
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total revenue  in state () is
 =  1 ()  + 

2 () (1 ) =

1 ()
+
(1 )
2 ()
(15)
and, for all states suciently close to (0 0), this simplies to
 =


 +
(1 )
(1 )(1 )
so


=
( )
(1 ) 
Note that 0 
  
 1 since 0() 	 as   0 and ¯ 	 1. Thus, 

	 0 for  	  and



 0 for  
 . Since  = 1 for all values of  when  = , it follows that if  
 
then  
 1 for some  	  suciently close to 0 and, similarly, if  	  then  
 1
for some  
  suciently close to 0. Hence the rm cannot deviate from  =  and still
repay its loan for all ().
We have the following result.
Proposition 2 The unique solution to the planner’s problem can be supported as an equi-
librium  = ( 0  

1 (·)   2 (·) 0 1 (·) 2 (·)  1 (·)  2 (·)   12) 
6 Extensions
6.1 Nominal interest rates
We have claimed that we can set nominal interest rates equal to zero without loss of gener-
ality. This is because the real rates of interest, which are all that matter when money is not
held as a store of value outside the banking system between periods, are independent of the
nominal rate as long as the price levels are adjusted appropriately. Suppose that
 = ( 0  

1 (·)   2 (·) 0 1 (·) 2 (·)  1 (·)  2 (·)  12 0 1)
is an equilibrium with interest rates normalized to 0 = 

1 = 0 and suppose that we choose
some arbitrary nominal interest rates 0 	 0 and 

1 	 0. Then we claim that there exists
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an equilibrium
0 = ( 0  

1 (·)   2 (·) 0 1 (·) 2 (·)  1 (·)  2 (·)  1  2  0  1 ) 
with the same allocation (1 (·)  2 (·)  ), where
 0 = 1 

1 () =
(1 + 0 )
1 ()
 and  2 () =
(1 + 0 ) (1 + 

1 )
2 ()

0 = 1

1 () =  (1 + 

0 )  and 

2 () = (1 + 

0 ) (1 + 

1 )
and
1 = (1 + 

0 ) and 

2 = (1 + 

0 ) (1 + 

1 ) 
Clearly, the money-market-clearing conditions (9) and (11) and the goods-market-clearing
conditions (10) and (12) are satised. The banks continue to earn zero prots since
1 =
 (1 + 0 )
(1 + 0 )
+
(1 ) (1 + 0 ) (1 + 1 )
(1 + 0 ) (1 + 

1 )

This equation says that the present value of repayments (respectively, withdrawals) equals
the value of the initial loan amount (respectively, the initial deposit amount). It is equally
easy to see that the bank cannot protably deviate from this strategy.
For rms, the zero-prot condition follows immediately from the fact that (a) expendi-
tures at date 0 equal the loan at date 0 and (b) the revenues at date  = 1 2 equal the
repayments at dates  = 1 2, respectively. The banks’ zero-prot condition implies that the
present value of the rm’s repayments equal the value of the loan, so the rm makes zero
prot on borrowing and lending. The optimality of storage in states where 1 () 
 

follows from the fact that 1 () = 

2 () implies that (1 + 

1 )

1 () = 

2 ().
The argument given in Section 9 can be used to show that there is no protable deviation
for rms from the ecient production plan.
6.2 Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and the interbank market
The preceding analysis can easily be extended to deal with heterogeneity in the liquidity
shocks received by individual banks. Suppose that banks are identied with points on the
unit interval and let  =  be the fraction of early consumers among bank ’s depositors,
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where {} are i.i.d. random variables with  [] = 1 for all . The ecient allocation is
the same as before and the market-clearing prices will also be the same as before since the
shocks {} are idiosyncratic and do not aect the aggregate proportion of early consumers.
Since in equilibrium the banks oer deposit contracts that satisfy 1 = 2 =  = 1, the
shock  has no eect on the bank’s ability to meet the withdrawals of its depositors. More
precisely,
 1 () 
 + 2 () (1 ) = 1
= + (1 )
= 

1 () 

1 () + (1 ) 2 () 2 () 
since  1 () 

1 () = 

2 () 

2 () = 
 = 1.
The banks with  	 1 borrow from banks with  
 1 at date 1 and repay the loan at
date 2 when the number of late consumers will be correspondingly lower. The interbank
market clears because the Law of Large Numbers implies thatZ 1
0
 = 1
Let 1 ( ) denote the net interbank borrowing at date 1 by a bank with shock  and
let 2 ( ) denote the repayment at date 2. Then, for every () and ,
1 ( ) = 
   1 ()1 ()
= 
  

1 ()
1 ()
= (  1) = (  1)
for every () and . Thus,Z 1
0
1 ( )  =
Z 1
0
(  1) = 0
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for every (). Similarly, at date 2,
2 ( ) = (1 )   2 () (1 ) 2 ()
= (1 )  (1 )

(1 ) 2 ()
(1 ) 2 ()
= ( ) = (1 )
for every () and . ThenZ 1
0
2 ( )  =
Z 1
0
(1 ) = 0
for every ().
6.3 Idiosyncratic return risk
One source of uncertainty that cannot be dealt with by monetary policy alone is idiosyncratic
or bank-specic asset return risk. In order to achieve ecient sharing of idiosyncratic asset
return risk, it is necessary to introduce new markets or institutions. To analyze this case, we
assume without loss of generality that there is no aggregate uncertainty and that there are
no idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. These risks can be shared eciently through the interbank
market and adjustments in the price level. We assume that the probability of being an early
consumer is a constant ¯ and that the expected return on the long asset is a constant ¯ 	 1,
but that each bank receives a random return ˜ on its holding of the long asset. The returns
are i.i.d. across banks and the mean return is 
h
˜
i
= ¯. Then the Law of Large Numbers
implies that Z 1
0
˜ = ¯
with probability one. In other respects the model remains the same as before.
To simplify the analysis further, we can assume that banks hold the long and short assets
directly, thus eliminating any reference to rms and their need to borrow.
From the point of view of the central planner, idiosyncratic risk is irrelevant. Since the
planner can redistribute returns in any way he pleases, only the aggregate (mean) return
matters. Since the mean return on the long asset is a constant, ¯, the central planner’s
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problem is essentially a decision problem under certainty: 4
max ¯ (1) +
¡
1 ¯¢ (2)
s.t. ¯1  
¯1 +
¡
1 ¯¢ 2 =  + (1 ) ¯
The short asset is used to satisfy the demands of early consumers and the long asset is
used to satisfy the demands of the late consumers. The optimum is characterized by the
rst-order condition
0 (1) = ¯0 (2) 
where
1 =

¯

2 =
(1 ) ¯
1 ¯ 
Now suppose that  is the ecient portfolio and (1 

2) is the ecient consumption
prole. How can we implement this outcome? At date 0, we can assume without loss of
generality that the price of goods is  0 = 1 and the money supply is 

0 = 1. The central
bank supplies money passively to the commercial banks that use it to buy goods from
consumers. The banks invest the goods in the short and long asset in the same proportions,
 and 1  , as the ecient allocation. The consumers then deposit their money in the
banks in exchange for a demand deposit contract promising them  units of money if they
withdraw at date  = 1 2. We can set 1 = 

2 = 1 on the assumption that the nominal
interest rates 0 and 

1 are both zero.
At dates 1 and 2, in order to satisfy the market clearing condition, the price levels must
be
 1 =
1
1
and  2 =
1
2

At these prices, the average bank (i.e., one that earns a return of ¯ on the long asset) will
be just solvent: the average bank requires one unit of money to repay its depositors and its
4In Section 3, we solved the planner’s problem in two stages. First, we maximized the consumer’s utility
at date 1 with respect to (1 2) for given values of  and (); then we maximized the consumer’s expected
utility with respect to  at date 0, taking the consumption functions 1 () and 2 () as given. Here,
the certain values of ¯ and ¯ are known at date 0, so we can optimize with respect to , 1 and 2 at date 0.
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portfolio will yield
 1 
 +  2 (1 ) ¯ =
1
1
 +
1
2
(1 ) ¯
= ¯+
¡
1 ¯¢ = 1
However, any bank that makes a return  
 ¯ on the long asset will have too little money
to meet the withdrawals of its depositors at dates 1 and 2 and any bank that makes a return
 	 ¯ will have more than enough money to meet its withdrawals.
This problem can be solved by providing banks with deposit insurance of the following
form: each bank that has a decit
¡
 ¯¢ (1 ) 
 0 is paid an amount of money equal
to
¡
¯¢ (1 ) 	 0, whereas any bank that has a surplus ¡ ¯¢ (1 ) 	 0 must
pay a tax equal to that amount. Then every bank has exactly the right nominal value of
assets to pay back its depositors and by construction the money market and goods markets
will clear. More precisely, if we set 1 = , then banks will have enough cash to pay the
early consumers one dollar each at date 0, the consumers will have enough cash to purchase
the ecient amount of good, since  1 

1 = 1, and the goods market will clear because
1 = 
. Similarly, if we set 2 = 1, the banks will have just enough money to pay the
late consumers one dollar each at date 2, the consumers will have enough cash to purchase
the ecient amount of the good, since  2 

2 = 1, and the goods market will clear because¡
1 + ¯
¢
2 = (1 ) ¯.
We have not specied the timing of the taxes and insurance payments very precisely
because, thanks to the interbank markets, the timing is not important. For concreteness,
we can assume that insurance payments are made and taxes collected at date 2. If banks
are short of money at date 1, they can simply borrow from the central bank or from other
commercial banks in order to obtain the necessary amounts to pay their depositors. Since
they are solvent in present value terms (taking into account insurance payments and taxes)
they can certainly repay these loans.
This brief sketch suggests how the ecient allocation might be implemented. To show
that these prices and quantities constitute an equilibrium, we need to check that banks are
maximizing consumers’ expected utility subject to the zero prot condition.
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There are, of course, many other ways to achieve the same end. A market solution would
require banks to pool their assets to get rid of the idiosyncratic risk. We could think of
this as a form of securitization in which the individual banks “originate loans” (i.e., make
investments in risky long assets) and then sell then sell these loans to an investment trust
in exchange for asset backed securities, i.e., bonds promising payments equal to the mean
return on the long asset. Another form of implementation would be to have an explicit
insurance contract where the asset returns are insured and the risk is pooled.
It is clear that none of these methods can avoid the necessity of making real transfers
among banks and that these transfers cannot be achieved through price level adjustments
alone. In practice such transfers may be dicult to accomplish. Banks with high returns
will have an incentive to hide them from both government and private schemes.
The reference to securitization also brings to mind the risks of moral hazard when banks
are eectively being oered insurance against idiosyncratic asset return shocks. For simplic-
ity, we have assumed here that asset returns are exogenous and that the returns on each
bank’s assets are observable (and veriable). In practice, a bank’s portfolio is endogenous
and opaque. Even when the bank’s choice is restricted to short and long assets, as here,
moral hazard issues can arise if the bank’s choice of portfolio cannot be observed (Bhat-
tacharya and Gale, 1987). More generally, banks choose the riskiness of the assets they hold
and insuring the asset returns will give the bank an incentive to hold even riskier assets. So
the problem of achieving ecient risk sharing when banks are exposed to idiosyncratic and
endogenous asset return risk is much more challenging than our simple model suggests.
To sum up, monetary policy alone is not sucient to eliminate idiosyncratic return risk
and, in the presence of moral hazard and asymmetric information, it may not be possible
to eliminate all idiosyncratic return risk in an incentive-compatible way. The incentive
ecient allocation of risk may still be subject to individual defaults and the possibility
of contagion. What we have provided here is a benchmark in the form of sucient (but
restrictive) conditions for eciency.
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6.4 The multi-period case
Suppose that, instead of three dates, we have a nite sequence of dates  = 0 1   . As
usual, all uncertainty is resolved at date 1, when the random vectors  = (1   ) and
R = (1   ) are realized. The random variable  is the fraction of consumers that wish
to consume only at date . There is a long asset for each date  = 1   . The random
variable  is the return on one unit of the good invested at date 0 in the asset that pays
o at date . We also allow for investment in the short asset at each date  = 1   . We
assume that the support of  is
n
  0 :P=1  = 1o and the support of R is [1 max] ,
for some 1 
 max 
 	. Since the long asset dominates the short asset, there will be no
investment in the short asset at date 0. However, the short asset may be used at subsequent
dates to smooth consumption intertemporally, for some realizations of (R)  For example,
when the realization of  is high, some of the output can be carried forward to oset high
liquidity shocks or low asset returns in subsequent periods.
Let  (R) denote the consumption at date  in state (R) and let x = (1   )
denote the portfolio of long assets. The planner will choose a portfolio x and a sequence of
consumption functions { (R)} in order to maximize
E
"
X
=1
 ( (R))
#
subject to
X
=1
 = 1
X
	=1
	 (R) 
X
	=1
		  (R) 
The rst constraint ensures that the investments in the long assets exhaust the endowment.
The second constraint ensures that, at every date, the cumulative consumption at that date
is less than or equal to the cumulative output at that date. These constraints incorporate
the possibility of storage. Let (x 1 (·)    (·)) denote the solution to this problem.
This solution has a simple form. If consumption could be carried forward and backward
through time without restriction, it would be optimal to equate per capita consumption each
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period. However, consumption can only be carried forward through time. When  is high
or  is low, it is optimal to carry forward output using the short term asset until there is
another high  or low  Thus the dates  = 1   can be partitioned into  intervals
{1  1}, {1 + 1  2},  , {
 + 1  }, where 0 = 0, 
+1 =  and  = 0  . Each of
these intervals { + 1  +1} corresponds to a sequence of dates where a positive amount
of the good is being stored at each date  + 1  +1  1 and none of the good is stored
at the last date +1. Then the rst-order conditions for the planner’s problem imply that
consumption is equalized across every date in the interval { + 1  +1} and the feasibility
conditions hold exactly at the end dates 1  
+1, that is,
X
	=1
	

	 (R) =
X
	=1
	

	 for  = 1  
These feasibility conditions clearly imply that
+1X
	=+1
	

	 (R) =
+1X
	=+1
	

	 for  = 0  
Using the fact that consumption is constant throughout the interval { + 1  +1}, we can
solve this equation for the value of  (R) for any  
 { + 1  +1} and the result is
 (R) =
P+1
	=+1
		P+1
	=+1
	
 (16)
We next show that the optimal solution to the planner’s problem can be decentralized
as an equilibrium. At date 0, we normalize 0 = 

0 = 1. Firms borrow one unit of money,
purchase the consumers’ endowments, and invest them in a portfolio x of the long assets.
We assume that the nominal interest rate on loans to the rms is zero. Consumers deposit
the money in the bank in exchange for a deposit contract that will oer  = 1 unit of
money to any consumer who withdraws at date .
To ensure the goods market clears, we set
  (R) =
1
 (R)

for every date  = 1   and every state (R). To ensure that the demand for money
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equals the supply, we dene the money supply functions recursively by setting
 (R) =  = 
for every date  = 1   and every state (R).
In the usual way, it can be shown that rms make zero prots and can repay their loans
and that banks break even on their loans and deposits. At each date , the amount of money
the representative bank borrows from the central bank,  (R) = , is returned to it as
the consumers pay   (R) 

 (R) =  to the rms in exchange for consumption and
the rms use this revenue to repay (part of) their debt to the banks. Over the course of
the dates  = 1   , the representative bank is paid one unit of money, the amount of the
initial loan. Note that it is optimal for the banks to choose  = 1. They can’t aord to pay
 	 1 and competition ensures  
 1 will not attract any customers. Since loans make
zero prots, the banks cannot increase prots by changing the amount of loans.
The analysis of the rm’s problem is contained in Appendix B in Section 9, where we
show that rms make zero prots if they choose the portfolio x and that they make losses
with positive probability if they choose any feasible x 6= x.
7 Conclusion
This paper has developed a model of banking with nominal contracts and money. We intro-
duce a wide range of dierent types of uncertainty, including aggregate return uncertainty,
aggregate liquidity shocks, and idiosyncratic (bank-specic) liquidity shocks. With deposit
contracts specied in real terms, as most of the literature assumes, these risks would lead to
banking crises. We have shown, however, that with nominal contracts and a central bank,
it is possible to eliminate nancial instability. More importantly, it is possible to achieve
the rst best allocation. This does not require heavy intervention by the central bank or
the government. All that is required is that the central bank accommodates the commercial
banks’ liquidity needs. Moreover, because the central bank can set the nominal interest
rate, they can also control the expected rate of ination. The one type of risk that cannot
easily be dealt with is idiosyncratic return shocks. This requires that the a government or
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private institution make transfers between banks with high and low returns to achieve the
rst best. Implementing this type of scheme is problematic as it creates moral hazard and
other incentive problems.
8 Appendix A
To characterize the ecient allocation, we assume that a planner invests in a portfolio of the
short and long assets and distributes the proceeds directly to the early and late consumers.
The portfolio of investments, expressed in per capita terms, consists of  units of the short
asset and 1   units of the long asset. The allocation of consumption will depend on
the random vector (), so we write the consumption prole of the typical consumer as
(1 ()  2 ()). Then the planner’s problem is to
max(12)  [(1 ()) + (1 )(2 ())]
s.t. 1 ()   and 1 () + (1 ) 2 ()   + (1 ) (17)
Note that the problem contains an innite number of constraints, one pair for each value of
(). The rst constraint says that the total consumption given to the early consumers
must not exceed the supply of the short asset at date 1. The second constraint says that
total consumption summed over the two dates cannot exceed the total returns of the two
assets. The constraints are expressed this way to take account of the possibility of storage
between date 1 and date 2.
For given values of  and (), the consumption prole (1 ()  2 ()) must maxi-
mize (1 ())+(1)(2 () subject to the two feasibility constraints. The rst-order
conditions for this problem, which are necessary and sucient, can be written as
0 (1 ()) 0 (2 ())  0
with the complementary slackness condition
[0 (1 ()) 0 (2 ())] [  1 ()] = 0
Note that 0 (1 ()) = 0 (2 ()) implies that 1 ()  2 () so the incentive
constraint is automatically satised. In other words, the rst best (Pareto-ecient) allocation
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is the same as the second best (incentive-ecient) allocation.
Since 0 (1 ()) = 0 (2 ()) implies that
1 () = 2 () =  + (1 )
the optimal consumption functions can be written as
1 () = min
n

  + (1 )
o
and 2 () = max
½
(1 )
1    + (1 )
¾

Substituting these values for 1 () and 

2 () into the planner’s problem, we obtain
the optimal portfolio choice problem:
max
01
E

(min
n

  + (1 )
o
) + (1 )(max
½
(1 )
1    + (1 )
¾
)
¸

The objective function is continuous in  and hence attains a maximum. Since the function
 is strictly concave, the maximizer  is unique.
9 Appendix B
The total revenue of a representative rm is
X
=1
  (R)

 =
X
=1

 (R)

Now consider the expression for the rm’s revenue during the interval { + 1  +1}. Since
there is no storage in the last period of each interval, (16) implies that
+1X
=+1

 (R)
=
+1X
=+1
μ+1
=+1

+1
=+1

¶
=
Ã P+1
	=+1
	P+1
	=+1
		
!
+1X
=+1

=
+1X
	=+1
	
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and hence
X
=1

 (R)
=

X
=0
+1X
	=+1
	 = 1
This proves that each rm earns zero prots and can repay its debt to the bank.
Can the rmmake a positive prot by deviating from the equilibrium portfolio x? Under
the assumptions we have made, we can show that it is not possible for the rm to deviate at
all without violating its budget constraint in some non-negligible set of states. The proof is
by contradiction. Suppose that x 6= x is a feasible portfolio, i.e., x  0 andP = 1, and
satises the budget constraint
X
=1
  (R)  1
for every (R). Note that we do not have to assume that x is protable in any state, just
that it at least breaks even. Now x some R and suppose that 0 = (0  0 1 0  0),
where the 1 is in the  -th place. Recall that by assumption 0 belongs to the support of
 and hence is the limit of a sequence of random vectors   0 that have a small but
positive measure of consumers at each date  = 1   . Then it is clear that, in the limit,
assuming the consumption functions are continuous in  and R, consumption will have to
be equalized at the dates 1   and will become unboundedly large at the dates  +1   .
Thus,
	 (R) =
½
 (R) for  = 1  
	 for  =  + 1  
and, therefore,
X
=1
  (R) =
X
	=1
		
 (R)

X
=1
  (R)


=
X
	=1
		
 (R)

Thus, for any  = 1   and any R,
X
	=1
		 
X
	=1
		
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This means that x provides at least as much output as x at every date and, since x 6= x,
there must be some date at which the inequality is strict. In other words, x produces strictly
more than x at some dates. But this contradicts the optimality of x. Thus, the only
optimal choice of portfolio is x = x.
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